Senior State Administration Officials on Venezuela

Senior State Administration Officials on Venezuela

Senior State Administration Officials on Venezuela

MODERATOR:  Great.  Thank you so much for joining us.  This is an on-background call attributable to Senior Administration Officials with [Senior Administration Official One], [Senior Administration Official Two], and [Senior Administration Official Three]. 

We will begin this call.  I would like to remind everyone it will be embargoed until the completion of the call.  If you would like to ask a question, please go ahead and use the “raise your hand” function and we will get to as many people as possible.

I will therefore turn it over to [Senior Administration Official One].

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE:  Good morning, everybody.  Thank you for joining us.  We appreciate your interest and also your patience.  I know we started the call a little late, but thank you for staying with us.  I’m really pleased also to be joined today by my colleagues from the Department of State and Department of Treasury to discuss some actions that we’re taking with respect to Venezuela.

Let me say at the outset that the situation in Venezuela is of critical importance to the United States.  We have been deeply engaged with and concerned by the process that emerged before and since the July 28th election.  We believe that it is extremely important that the voices of the Venezuelan people are heard and that their votes are respected.  And we have been working day and night with allies, both within the Western Hemisphere and beyond, to ensure that Venezuela can be put on a more sustainable and democratic path.

With that as context, we are holding this call today to inform you of two important actions that the United States government is taking to hold Nicolás Maduro and his representatives accountable for conducting electoral fraud, falsifying election results, and intensifying repression against the Venezuelan people in order to silence their voices and their vote and to illegitimately extend Maduro’s rule.

First, the Department of Treasury today will sanction 16 Maduro-affiliated officials, including leaders of the National Electoral Council, otherwise known as the CNE, and the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the TSJ, who impeded a transparent electoral process and the release of accurate election results.  We are also taking actions against military intelligence and government officials who are responsible for intensifying repression through intimidation, indiscriminate detentions, and censorship.

In the announcements we are making today, we made sure to include the judge and the prosecutor who authorized the politically motivated, unwarranted, and unjustified arrest warrant for the successful presidential candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia.  As many of you know, Mr. González Urrutia was forced to depart Venezuela and seek protection in Spain last weekend.

Concurrently, the Department of State is imposing new visa restrictions on a significant number of Maduro-aligned officials who’ve undermined the electoral process in Venezuela and are responsible for acts of repression.  We are taking these actions today because it has become abundantly clear to us not only that Edmundo González Urrutia won the most votes in Venezuela’s presidential election on July 28th, but also that Maduro and his representatives are intent on denying this fact and instead seek to cling to power at all costs. 

Since the July 28th election, Maduro and his representatives have indiscriminately arrested Venezuelans for exercising their political and civil rights, and they have deployed a range of intimidation tactics to silence the opposition.  These acts include the issuance of the arrest warrant for González Urrutia as well as other significant and concerning actions against Venezuela’s democratic political actors and members of civil society.  Today’s steps build on multiple actions that we have taken to hold current and former Venezuelan officials accountable for undermining democracy in Venezuela and violating human rights. 

In addition to the 16 specific sanctions that are – that we are discussing today, overall the United States government has sanctioned over 140 Venezuelan individuals and 100 Venezuelan entities.  And we also regularly take actions to enforce our sanctions policy with respect to Maduro and his cronies. 

For example, just last week, on September 2nd, U.S. law enforcement officials seized an aircraft in the Dominican Republic that had been illegally acquired by Maduro.  Cumulatively, the U.S. government has imposed visa restrictions on nearly 2,000 Venezuelan individuals for their role in undermining democracy, significant corruption, and human rights violations. 

It’s extremely important to note that the United States does not stand alone in expressing our concerns with Maduro’s antidemocratic actions, and that we are joined by partners and allies both within the Western Hemisphere and across the world in our call for the restitution of democratic process and order in Venezuela. 

This morning, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, the United States stands beside Panama and more than 30 other countries from across the region and the globe to express our continued commitment to a restoration of democracy in Venezuela, as well as to express our deep concern with the politically motivated arrest warrant that had been issued for Mr. González Urrutia.  In addition, in the past several weeks since the July 28th election, the Organization of American States has adopted a resolution by consensus calling for transparency, impartial review, and protection of electoral integrity.

The United States, the European Union, and more than 20 governments signed a joint statement in the Dominican Republic calling for greater electoral transparency and accountability in Venezuela.  The United States has joined ten regional partners in issuing a joint statement condemning the Supreme Tribunal of Justice’s decision to certify the National Electoral Council’s unsubstantiated claims that Maduro won.  And the United States has joined with other nations in calling for a special session of the OAS Permanent Council to address the human rights impacts of the electoral crisis in Venezuela.

The United States will continue to work with our international partners to defend democratic freedoms in Venezuela and ensure Maduro and his representatives are held accountable for their actions.  We remain deeply committed to supporting the aspiration of the Venezuelan people for a more prosperous and democratic future for their country. 

Thank you.  And with that, I will turn it back to the moderator.

MODERATOR:  Thank you very much.  Again, if you would like to ask a question, please use the “raise your hand” function and we will get to as many as possible. 

Our first question is from Matt Spetalnick from Reuters.  Matt, you have the floor.

QUESTION:  Thank you very much.  So what, if any, consideration is being given to going beyond individual sanctions and taking further action that would hit Venezuela’s oil sector?  For example, are you considering adding restrictions to Chevon’s license or other foreign companies already operating there?  And to what extent, if any, are you holding back from the oil sector sanctions at this stage because of concern that it might cause a spike in global oil prices and further damage the Venezuelan economy, as well as spurring increased migration, possibly even to the U.S.-Mexico border? 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE:  Thank you for the question.  We are constantly monitoring very closely the political and economic developments in Venezuela and are committed to calibrating our sanctions policy appropriately in response both to events on the ground, as well as broader U.S. national interests.  In coordination with our partners, we’re also considering a range of options to demonstrate to Maduro and his representatives that their illegitimate and repressive actions in Venezuela will have consequences.

We are also very focused on the enforcement of existing sanctions, as well as evaluating how best to calibrate our sanctions policy towards Venezuela in light of overall U.S. interests.  Most importantly, we are – continue to commit to promoting accountability for actors in Venezuela who are undermining democratic process and the will of the Venezuelan people.

MODERATOR:  Great.  Thank you.  Our next question is from Nick Schifrin with PBS.  Nick, you should be unmuted. 

QUESTION:  Sorry about that.  Thanks very much, [Senior Administration Official One].  Appreciate it.  U.S. officials have talked about why they haven’t taken this step in the past – because they wanted diplomacy to take course.  So does the fact that you’re taking these steps today mean you’ve concluded that regional diplomacy has and will continue to fail?  And is this being done in coordination with any other regional actors?  Are there regional actions being taken today by other countries?  And will you declare Mr. González the winner of the election and/or the president-elect?  Thanks. 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE:  Thanks for the question.  First of all, I would dispute your assertion that regional diplomacy has failed.  In fact, I think that the careful diplomatic work that we have been doing with a range of partners in this region have – has been extraordinarily important in terms of ensuring that the results – the fraudulent results that the Maduro authorities have published have not been widely accepted. 

And so while there are some differences and variations in terms of the diplomatic stances that a range of our partners have taken, I think that it has maintained a level of diplomatic pressure on Venezuela that would not have been possible without the very steady work and nearly constant communication that we have with our partners throughout the region, as well as in the European Union and beyond.

In my opening remarks, I referenced the events that are taking place at the United Nations today, where countries from the region but also beyond, as well as the United States, are calling for greater accountability and respect for democratic norms in Venezuela. 

With respect to Mr. González Urrutia, we stand by our conclusions and the statement made by Secretary Blinken several days after the July 28th election, where we believe that there is clear evidence that Mr. González Urrutia won the most votes in this election, and therefore that fact needs to be respected and validated by Venezuelan authorities.

MODERATOR:  Great.  Our next question is from Regina Garcia Cano from AP.

QUESTION:  Hi.  Thank you for taking my question.  I am wondering:  What are the expected results from this round of sanctions?  The release from the Treasury Department lists military officials, C&E officials, and other allies of Mr. Maduro that have been sanctioned in the past and all of them continue to be with – continue to be part of Venezuela’s government.  They have consolidated their position also within the government there.  So what exactly is the expectation for this latest round of sanctions?

And you just mention that you think that the fact that Mr. González received the most votes in the election should be respected and validated by Venezuelan officials.  But why – why is there hesitancy to call Mr. González the president-elect, or winner?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE:  Thank you for your question, and I will also ask my colleague from Treasury who’s on the line to comment on the impact of these sanctions.

I would just say that for someone who is an official in Venezuela, who participated either in the falsification of electoral results or in overseeing or committing acts of repression in Venezuela, when they see their name as an individual on the OFAC sanctions list, today is not a good day.  And I think that we believe that this should prompt deeper reflection of officials aligned with Maduro about how far they want to go down this path of facilitating a blatant effort to cling to power by Maduro.

I will pause here for a moment so my colleague from Treasury can comment on the impact of these sanctions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL THREE:  Thank you, [Senior Administration Official One].  This is [Senior Administration Official Three].  I appreciate the question.  I think to [Senior Administration Official One]’s point, these targeted individual designations serve to highlight individual actors that are engaged in sanctionable behavior, like human rights abuse or undermining the democratic processes in Venezuela. 

You are correct that Treasury has previously taken action against government – the Government of Venezuela, and officials serving in the Government of Venezuela are blocked.  But this additional step of designation adds these individuals’ names to our specially – list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, and that has implications.  And from a messaging standpoint, they are now out there on our publicly accessible list.

It is highlighted in our press release the implications of these designations, but just to highlight a few of those points:  As a result of this action, all property and interested property of the designated persons that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  And it also clarifies that any entities that are owned directly or indirectly in the aggregate – 50 percent or more – are also blocked.  And this becomes easier for the compliance community to identify any of those 50 percent or more entities, because these individuals are now on our SDN list, and banks all over the world clear and review that list.  So with that, I bet there are additional impacts to these designations, and I’d be happy to take any more specific questions on technical sanctions matters.

Thanks, [Senior Administration Official One].  Back over to you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE:  Great.  Thank you.  And now just a quick comment on the second part of the question as related to Mr. González Urrutia.  It is our view that Edmundo González Urrutia remains an indisputable voice for peace and democratic change in Venezuela.  His departure from Venezuela was the direct result of the anti-democratic measures that Nicolás Maduro has unleashed on the Venezuelan people, including measures that were specifically directed against Mr. González Urrutia and other opposition leaders since the election. 

And based on all the evidence that we have seen presented by civil society, by the documentation of more than 80 percent of the actas, or the ballot tally sheets from the July 28th election – and which has been corroborated by independent observers, as well as analyses done by journalistic and other independent institutions of these tally sheets – we believe that Mr. González Urrutia won the most votes in the July 28th election.  Thank you.

MODERATOR:  Great.  Our next question is from Alex Ward with Wall Street Journal.  Alex, you should be unmuted.

QUESTION:  Yes, thank you.  I mean, just kind of directly here:  Does the administration expect these sanctions to see Maduro – will cause Maduro to leave office before this term ends in January?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE:  Thank you for the question.  We believe that there is still significant time between today and January for actors in Venezuela, including Nicolás Maduro, to begin to make better decisions than they have made to date.  And so we see these sanctions as an important step in shaping the overall context of the political trajectory in Venezuela. 

But you have to remember that these steps are also being taken against the backdrop of a larger effort in which the United States has joined with partners and allies both within this hemisphere and around the world, which includes diplomacy, diplomatic pressure – in this case, specific individually targeted sanctions – and other steps, so that the will of the Venezuelan voters as expressed on July 28th is respected.

MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question comes from Celia Mendoza with VOA.  Celia, you should be unmuted.

QUESTION:  Yes.  Great.  Thank you so much.  I have a couple of questions.  So you mentioned the foreign minister of Panama today, and he was asked at the end of the event about a possible resolution with the United Nations about Venezuela.  And he said that they’re not ready for that because it’s not a unified position between the members.  Can you talk about that?  What are the difference between the members? 

And in terms of the sanctions, will these sanctions affect family members of those sanctioned, which will be living in other places and they might be benefiting from those members in the government? 

And finally, we understand that this is trying to pressure Maduro to keep moving – to try to do, as you have mentioned, the right thing and recognize the Edmundo Gutiérrez – Urrutia González received the most amounts of votes. But so far, he has not budged into the conversations with Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia.  Will these sanctions will help with that, knowing that countries like Mexico have opposed to sanctions against Venezuela in the past, and they supposed to be in the process of those negotiations?  Thank you. 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE:  Great.  Thank you for your question.  First, I really want to salute the leadership of Panama and how they have stepped up to mobilize other countries both in this hemisphere and more broadly to support democratic process and democratic rights in Venezuela.  We are extremely appreciative of the role that they have played. 

I will defer to my colleague at the State Department if he would like to add anything further on actions at the United Nations.  I will just say that as it relates to some of the other countries that you mention – including Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico – we remain in intensive dialogue with all of these countries about the current situation in Venezuela.  And while that does not necessarily mean that the – that U.S. sanctions towards Venezuela alone are enough to prompt a change there, we do very much appreciate the diplomatic efforts that have been – taken place with other countries in the region.  Thank you. 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL TWO:  Hey, [Senior Administration Official One], I would just complement what you said by, again, thanking our Panamanian colleagues for their leadership role at the UN this morning and note that they are part of a much larger group of regional countries and governments who are working across a number of international fora, seizing every opportunity to highlight our concerns about what’s happening in Venezuela, the repression against democratic actors and civil society leaders, as well as our collective demand that the results of the elections on July 28th be respected.

We recently saw just in the last day or so Argentina taking the lead in Geneva in the UN Human Rights Commission on a measure that sends similar messages.  We – [Senior Administration Official One] mentioned earlier, activity in the OAS which we expect to continue, providing scrutiny on the situation in Venezuela and pushing for a restoration of democratic norms.  And we also look forward to the gathering of leaders at the UN later this month, which may provide additional opportunities for the many governments around the world that share our concerns and hopes for Venezuela to work together to reinforce these messages.  Thanks. 

MODERATOR:  Thank you very much for joining us.  That is, unfortunately, all the time we have for questions today.  As a reminder, this call was conducted on background, so the individuals who were speaking can be attributed as senior administration officials.  As the call is now ending, the embargo has broken and you are free to use.  Thank you very much again for joining us. 

Official news published at https://www.state.gov/senior-state-administration-officials-on-venezuela/

Politics - JISIP NEWS originally published at Politics - JISIP NEWS

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