Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink on the Secretary’s Upcoming Travel to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic

MR PATEL:  Good morning, everybody, and thanks so much for joining this morning’s call.  I’ll lay out some ground rules first.  We’ll do this call on the record but under embargo until the call’s conclusion.  Joining us today we have Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Dan Kritenbrink.  He’ll talk to you a little about the Secretary’s upcoming trip to Laos, and after that we will take a couple of questions.

So with that, Ambassador Kritenbrink, over to you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Vedant, thanks so much for the introduction, and good morning, everyone.  Really appreciate your joining us here today, and I’m excited to be able to speak with you about Secretary Blinken’s upcoming travel to Laos, where he will represent the United States at the various ASEAN-related meetings.  This will be the Secretary’s second trip to Vientiane this year, and it will be his 19th trip to the region as Secretary.

Let me start off by underscoring the unprecedented expansion of U.S.-ASEAN relations over the past three years, including our upgrade to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with ASEAN in 2022, and the elevation of our engagement to the ministerial level in multiple sectors.  Our doing so reflects our deep commitment to our partners and friends in Southeast Asia.

We have not only strengthened, of course, the U.S.-ASEAN partnership, but also our relationship with a number of ASEAN member-states bilaterally.  For example, in the past year alone we have overseen the historic elevation to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership relationship with both Vietnam and Indonesia.  We’ve elevated our Strategic Partnership with Singapore to unprecedented heights, and we’ve announced our intention to elevate our ties with Brunei to a Strategic Partnership as well.  Our bilateral work with ASEAN member-states and our work with ASEAN is – both of those are mutually reinforcing.

We sincerely appreciate the Lao PDR for its excellent work this year in hosting the many ASEAN meetings.  We remain committed to advancing the U.S.-Lao PDR Comprehensive Partnership and to developing our economic and people-to-people ties to support greater prosperity for the people of Laos.

We’re building these relationships through our engagements across the region and at all levels.  We have seen President Biden and Vice President Harris visit a total of six countries in Southeast Asia, and we’ve had multiple visits by a range of U.S. cabinet-level officials and other presidential appointees, as well as visits by hundreds of individual members of Congress from both parties.

And while President Biden will not attend the ASEAN Leaders Summit this year, there should be absolutely no doubt regarding his and the United States strong commitment to the region.  Just two weeks ago, President Biden met with Vietnam General Secretary and President To Lam on the margins of UN General Assembly High-Level Week, and the President was also proud to host Philippine President Marcos earlier this year for a bilateral meeting and an historic trilateral leader summit with Japan.

We also continue to maintain our strong economic and people-to-people ties.  The United States is ASEAN’s largest source of foreign direct investment.  More than 6,200 U.S. businesses have contributed to $500 billion in total trade between the U.S. and all the nations of ASEAN in 2023, creating hundreds of thousands of jobs in all 50 states and 1 million jobs throughout Southeast Asia.  In addition, over 50,000 students from Southeast Asia study in the United States every year.

Now, as I’ve noted, we – while we’ve been strengthening our partnerships across the region, we’ve also overseen an unprecedented expansion of our ties with ASEAN as an institution.  As President Biden has made clear, ASEAN is at the heart of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.  We are committed to ASEAN’s centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.  Our partnership with ASEAN is critical to maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific.  In the two years since we have upgraded our partnership with ASEAN to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, we have bolstered cooperation on the issues that matter most to our combined 1 billion people: inclusive economic growth, cyber, the digital economy, climate change, health security, and maritime security, to name just a few.

And I’m proud to note that we have made remarkable progress in delivering on our commitments under the ASEAN-U.S. Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Plan of Action and Annex.  According to the ASEAN secretary, we have implemented over 98 percent of our commitments, and we look forward to highlighting our affirmative agenda with ASEAN during the summits later this week.

Let me also discuss briefly just a few details regarding what we are hoping to accomplish on the ground in the Vientiane.  Secretary Blinken will of course participate in the East Asia Summit and the U.S.-ASEAN Summit, during which he will reiterate our strong commitment to ASEAN’s centrality, our strong support for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.  The Secretary will highlight how the U.S.-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is delivering concrete benefits for our combined 1 billion people, including through our economic cooperation and increased engagement on the digital economy and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence.

We would anticipate, of course, that the Secretary will also discuss pressing geopolitical issues, including the ongoing crisis in Burma, the importance of upholding international law in the South China Sea, and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.  In addition, Secretary Blinken will reaffirm U.S. support for the Lao PDR ASEAN chair year and his commitment to further strengthening the U.S.-Lao PDR Comprehensive Partnership.

So let me close here by reiterating that we very much look forward to a productive trip to Vientiane, and we intend to share additional details on the Secretary’s schedule along the way.  Vedant, why don’t I kick it back to you, and I really look forward to the questions today.  Thanks very much.

MR PATEL:  Thanks so much, Assistant Secretary.  Journalist colleagues, if you have a question, you can use the “raise hand” function, and we’ll try to get through as many questioners as we can.

So first, why don’t we start with Shaun Tandon from AFP.

QUESTION:  Hey, Dan.  Can you hear me?

MR PATEL:  Yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION:  Great, great – thanks —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Loud and clear.

QUESTION:  (Laughter) – okay, great.  Thanks for doing this.  You addressed this in your opening remarks, but just to put a point on it, and it’s not the first time that the President has missed the East Asia Summit.  And with so much going on in the Middle East, is there any concern on your part about other countries taking a more prominent position if the U.S. isn’t being represented at the head of state level and what message that sends with so much going on around the world?  And, of course, as the President’s also traveling elsewhere.

And if I could just touch on one other issue.  The – on Burma, which you mentioned – if I’m not mistaken, this is the first time in a few years that the junta has sent a representative, albeit a low-level one.  What do you make of this?  Is this a sign of any more greater flexibility, of any greater hope?  How do you see that?  And what, if anything, do you expect to happen in Myanmar on this?  Thanks.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Shaun, thanks very much for your questions.  Nice to hear from you.  Look, Shaun, as I tried to note in my opening comments, I think that the strength of America’s commitment to ASEAN and to Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region and the President’s personal commitment to the importance of the region – those are both crystal-clear and unmistakable.

And when you think about the President hosting the ASEAN leaders at the White House for the first-ever U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Washington, D.C., you think about the President’s and the Vice President’s travel to the region on multiple occasions, visiting six countries in Southeast Asia; you think about the unprecedented way that we’ve upgraded not just our engagement with ASEAN as an institution, but with the various partners in Southeast Asia, including just a couple that I mentioned earlier, Vietnam and Indonesia; and then, of course, if you broaden the aperture a bit and look at our unprecedented engagement led by the President across the entire Indo-Pacific, I think the message is crystal-clear that the United States of America, under the Biden-Harris administration, is committed to the Indo-Pacific in clear and unmistakable ways.

On issues related to Burma, let me just speak very candidly, Shaun.  This will certainly be a top issue that the Secretary will raise while he’s there.  We do continue to support the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, but I think the key message here is that we support efforts by ASEAN and the broader international community to continue to press the junta to take the steps necessary, such as reducing violence, releasing political prisoners, increasing humanitarian assistance to the people of Burma, and engaging with the democratic opposition in dialogue.  And unfortunately, we have seen virtually zero progress on any of those priorities.  And so I would expect the Secretary will continue to emphasize to partners in the region that we must keep up pressure on the regime, we must continue to collectively support the people of Myanmar, and we must continue to insist that the regime take these steps before there can be any meaningful change in our approach.

We have continued to support ASEAN’s downgrading of Burmese representation at the ASEAN-related meetings, and they have participated in previous meetings at a non-political level.  And we certainly support that.  But I think the key, Shaun, has to be the junta has to take the steps required to end this crisis.  They haven’t done that yet.  We won’t stop until they do.

MR PATEL:  Thanks so much.  Let’s next go to the line of Nike Ching.

QUESTION:  Good morning.  Can you hear me?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Loud and clear.

QUESTION:  Thank you.  Thank you for that, and good morning, Dan.  Thank you very much for this phone briefing.  Several newly elected leaders, including the prime ministers of Thailand and Japan, are set to participate in the ASEAN and East Asia Summits.  Does the Secretary plan to hold separate talks with them on the sidelines of ASEAN?

And separately, if you may indulge me, how does the U.S. assess the new prime minister of Thailand’s approach to the Myanmar crisis?  Do you perceive an effort to reset the strategy?  Is there a sense that the new government will be more inclined to work through ASEAN on the Myanmar issue, rather than engaging directly with the Burmese junta?

In addition, then, can you comment on the elections the junta is planning to hold in 2025?  Can it be free and fair, given the conditions on the ground?

And finally, over the weekend Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te remarked that in terms of age, it is absolutely impossible for the People’s Republic of China to be considered the motherland of the people of the Republic of China.  On the contrary, the ROC may be the motherland of the people of the PRC who are over 75 years old.  His reasoning was that the PRC was established on October 1st, 1949, while the ROC will celebrate its 113th anniversary on October 10th, also known as Double Tenth.  Would you like to comment on this?  Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Nike, thank you very much.  Let me – hopefully I’m tracking all four of your questions.  Let me try to respond to them to the best of my ability.

First, yes, Nike, we of course note the election of new leaders across the region.  We’ve congratulated both the new prime ministers of Thailand and Japan.  We very much look forward to working with both of the prime ministers to continue to strengthen these critically important alliances to the United States.

I don’t have anything to announce today on any of the Secretary’s specific bilateral engagements in Vientiane, but of course we’ve made a particular point of emphasizing how much we look forward to, again, working with both of the new leaders in Thailand and Japan, and to strengthening both of these critically important treaty alliances in the region.

Nike, I’m not going to comment, I think, in any detail on Thailand’s specific approach to the Burma crisis.  I will just note that Thailand remains one of America’s most important partners in the region, including on the Burma issue.  We have extensive, close, and ongoing consultations on a range of issues, including Burma.  We’re very grateful to our Thai allies for the support they have provided to a number of refugees who have fled the crisis in Myanmar, and we continue to consult regularly on how we can collectively work together to try to improve the situation on the ground in Myanmar, and in ways that hopefully will improve the lives of the Burmese people.  We do that directly, and we do that together with partners in ASEAN as well.  And I would anticipate that work will continue closely, including under the prime minister’s new government.

On the specific question about elections in Burma, I will say that we remain deeply concerned by the regime’s stated claims to hold elections, because any elections under current conditions would stand no chance of expressing the will of the people of Burma.  The junta has yet to make any progress on the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus or take any steps to reduce the widespread violence that would allow any elections to be credible, safe, and again, representative of the will of people – of the people of Burma.

We also fear, Nike, that premature elections would not just be – would be neither representative nor inclusive, and perhaps even more importantly, such elections under those conditions would likely only generate more violence and prolong the ongoing crisis.  So elections should not take place prior to genuine peace and reconciliation, and we’ll continue to make that position clear.

On your final question, Nike, about President Lai Ching-te’s comments, I’ll refer you to Taipei and to President Lai’s office for any commentary on his specific comments on any matter.  I will just state that, as you’re well aware, America’s longstanding “one China” policy remains unchanged.  It’s guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.  We oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, we do not support Taiwan independence, and we expect cross-strait differences to be resolved peacefully.  And of course, as you well know, Nike, our fundamental interest is in the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and that will continue to be our focus going forward.  Thank you.

MR PATEL:  Thanks so much.  Let’s next go to David Brunnstrom with Reuters.

QUESTION:  Sorry, I had lost my unmute button.  I hope you can hear me now.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Yeah, can hear you now.  Go ahead, David.

QUESTION:  Yeah, I just wondered to what extent a relationship with China will come up.  Will the U.S. be seeking a bilateral with the Chinese side?

I’m also curious to know what’s your latest thinking on the new Japanese prime minister, whether there will be a meeting with him, and also about his campaign comments in support of an Asian NATO.  Is that do you believe now fallen by the wayside, or is that something that is still – is up for discussion?  Many thanks.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  David, thanks very much for your questions.  Let me try to take them in order.

Look, on the PRC, I think you could expect, David, that a number of PRC-related issues are likely to come up in the context of the ASEAN meetings, including the situation in the South China Sea and China’s continuing to take a number of escalatory and irresponsible steps designed to coerce and pressure many in the South China Sea claimants.  So I think as is always is the case, given how central the South China Sea is to regional and global peace and stability, that that will be a key issue that will come up.

As far as any engagements with the PRC, I certainly don’t have anything to announce today.  But I would note, David, that we’ve had frequent and extensive engagement with PRC counterparts in recent weeks.  Less than two weeks ago on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York, of course, Secretary Blinken had a productive and candid meeting with Director and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.  And just a couple of weeks before that, the National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan was in Beijing for extensive meetings, not just with Director Wang but also with President Xi and the chair of the Central Military Commission.  So I think our channels of communication with the PRC remain open, and we’ll continue to focus, as we always have, on not just defending U.S. national interests and those of our allies, but also to managing responsibly our competition with China.

On Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba, of course, we have congratulated the prime minister on his election.  The President was grateful to have an opportunity to speak with the prime minister via phone just last week, shortly after his election.  And of course, Secretary Blinken also held a call with the new Japanese foreign minister.  So again, I don’t have anything to announce on the specifics of the Secretary’s schedule on the ground, but we very much look forward to engaging with the new Japanese government to continue the unprecedented strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  And I think, as you know, the U.S.-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of regional peace and prosperity, and our alliance is increasingly global in nature.  And I’m confident it will continue to be that way and reach really unprecedented heights in the years ahead.

MR PATEL:  Thank you so much.   Let’s go to Julia Jester with NBC.

QUESTION:  Hi.  Hopefully you can hear me.  I have a follow up to the last question.  I know you said you’re not going to speak to any specifical – specific bilats, engagements, but a big point of topic the last time Blinken and his Chinese counterpart spoke in Vientiane was about China’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base and concerns about China’s influence in the war in Ukraine.  Since that last meeting – and I know there have been conversations since – have – what has the State Department seen with regard to China’s actions or lack thereof?  And if Blinken were to speak with his Chinese counterpart, would the tone of such a meeting regarding that topic be as open and productive as it was before?  Just trying to gauge if there was any progress on that front.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Julia, thanks very much for your question.  I would say this:  Our concerns regarding China’s strong support for the Russian defense industrial base, they remain, they are ongoing, and I would say they are growing.  It’s very clear to us that, again, China’s unprecedented support for the Russian defense industrial base is helping to fuel Russia’s war against Ukraine.  And we have made crystal clear – including in our engagements with PRC counterparts, most recently in New York less than two weeks ago – the depth of our concern and our commitment as well to taking a number of steps to curb those actions, including more than 300 sanctioned – sanctions-related actions against PRC entities.

So as we noted, it – China needs to take responsible steps.  They need to stop fueling the Russian war machine through their support for the Russian defense industrial base.  And we’ll continue to take steps together with partners elsewhere, including in Europe, to curb that behavior going forward.

MR PATEL:  Thanks so much.  Unfortunately, that’s all the time we have for this morning.  I want to thank everyone for joining.  And as a reminder, this call was on the record and embargoed until the call’s conclusion, which we’ll be concluding momentarily.  Thanks a lot, everybody.